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a b s t r a c t
Defined benefit pension plan sponsors have taken on greater risks for sponsoring these plans in the last
several years. Due to ever increasing concerns of longevity risk and the weak economic environment,
sponsors are eager to understand their pension-related risks to facilitate optimal enterprise decision-
making. Borrowing an analytical framework from the life insurance and annuity industry where the
amount of risk is framed in terms of the total assets required to remain solvent over a one-year period
with a high level of confidence, i.e., the economic capital approach, this paper develops a benchmark risk
measure for pension sponsors by obtaining a total asset requirement for sustaining the pension plan.
The difference between the total asset requirement and the actual trust assets thus provides a measure
of sponsor assets at risk due to plan sponsorship. Two factor-based approaches are proposed for this
calculation. The first approach develops a set of pension-specific factors as if the pension plan were a
group annuity. The second approach directly simulates the risk drivers of the pension plan and develops
a framework for obtaining factors and calculating the pension risk given a desired confidence level. Our
approach is very easy to implement and monitor in practice.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Defined benefit pension plans have contributed to major cor-
porate and government failure in the recent years. Most recently,
a $3.5 billion unfunded pension liability of the City of Detroit was
part of the reason it sought bankruptcy protection (Biggs, 2013). It
was also one of the leading concerns for large corporations such as
General Motors in times of financial difficulties. The pension spon-
sors can self-fund these plans by establishing a trust fund and con-
tribute assets into the trust or they can support these plans through
purchasing group annuities from insurance companies. One chal-
lenge that self-funded sponsors have is to understand the risk they
are taking by providing such a plan, lack of which knowledge ul-
timately results in many corporate sponsors dropping their de-
fined benefit plans. In essence, this boils down to an enterprise
decision-making problem where the pension sponsors have to
decide whether the benefits of a pension plan (e.g., in employee
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0/).retention, tax benefits, etc.) justify the risk they take and the op-
portunity cost it imposes on the assets they can use in developing
their core business strength (cf., Ai et al., 2012; SEI, 2013). It is also
of critical concern how to optimally manage the risks of the plan
by properly allocating assets across the enterprise. A first step to
achieve these enterprise goals is to provide the sponsors a gauge
of the pension-related risks, which is the objective of this paper.
Such a risk measure can also provide regulators and other stake-
holders with easy access to critical information on the viability of
the pension plan.
Traditional defined benefit pension plans sponsored by private
sector employers held 2.34 trillion in assets at the end of the
first quarter of 2012 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2012). Despite the decline in the use of these plans over the
years they still comprise a significant portion of the US economy.
Because of low interest rates and mediocre investment returns in
the recent financial environment, cash contributions to pension
plans sponsored by private sector plans are expected to average
$90 billion a year between 2010–2020 (Society of Actuaries, 2010).
Managing these plans, includingmeasuring andmanaging the risks
continues to be an important endeavor.
In this paper we develop a conceptual framework and illustrate
the design of a pension plan risk measure for the pension spon-
sors, by borrowing the capital charge factor-based approach that
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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and life insurance and annuity companies have developed along
different paths. They are subject to different regulatory systems
and often employ very different investment strategies and actuar-
ial techniques formeasuring liabilities. Anothermajor difference is
the legal structure of the two entities. Life and annuity companies
are expected to be economically self-sufficient. Qualified pension
plans, however, are set up as trustswith sponsors that are expected
to provide financial resources if trust assets are insufficient to pay
benefits.
Despite the differences, both insurance companies and pension
sponsors make similar economic promises to the beneficiaries
and carry similar risks by financing these plans. A pension plan
sponsor often uses the delayed benefits provided by a pension as a
replacement for current compensation in exchange for employees’
services. Insurance companies make a similar promise of future
benefits to annuity policyholders in exchange for the premium
payments. They then take on a set of risks including longevity
risk, asset investment risk, interest rate risk, and operational risk.
Both pension sponsors and life insurers must make good on those
promises given these risks or face bankruptcy or conservatorship.
In addition, pension sponsors’ core business activities and
survivorship can be threatened by poorly managed pension risks.
In light of these similarities, we propose to translate the
approach that insurers use to estimate risk taking to determine
the amount of risk that private pension sponsors face. Insurers
often frame the amount of risk it holds in terms of the total assets
required to remain solvent over a one-year periodwith a high level
of confidence, i.e., an economic capital calculation. We obtain a
similar total asset requirement for sustaining a privately sponsored
pension plan. The difference between the total asset requirement
and the actual assets in the trust is thus ameasure of sponsor assets
at risk due to plan sponsorship. Note that such a risk measure is
designed as a summary measure of risk taking in sponsoring a
pension plan and can be used as an important input in separate
business decision making processes aiming at optimizing the risk-
adjusted rate of return for the owners of the sponsoring firms. But
themeasure is not intended to be used as a direct indication for the
optimal funding level or the amount of assets to set aside.
Under the same conceptual framework, we propose two cap-
ital charge factor-based approaches to calculate pension total as-
set requirements. First, we build upon the existing Standard &
Poor’s capital factors widely adopted by insurers to develop a set
of pension-specific factors as if the pension plan were a group an-
nuity. Second, we directly simulate the underlying risk drivers for
the plan and develop a framework for obtaining factors and calcu-
lating the pension risk given a desired confidence level. We design
a realistic sample pension plan to illustrate our methodology and
conduct additional analyses to test the robustness of our factors
when used for plans with different characteristics. We also discuss
the practical relevance of the proposed approaches. This frame-
work can also inform corporate and government decisions in for-
eign markets where defined benefit plans can still be a dominant
solution for the aging societies.
Our work is closely related to the literature on the various
aspects of understanding and managing risks in defined-benefit
pension plans. A large literature aims at finding the optimal con-
tribution and asset allocation strategies with difference pertinent
objectives and constraints. Recently, for example, Maurer et al.
(2009) minimize the variance of plan contributions subject to a
conditional Value-at-Risk constraint on total plan cost. Delong et al.
(2008) investigate the optimal investment strategy by minimiz-
ing funding variation. Cotter et al. (2012) examine the under-
funding status of defined benefit plans and discusses alternative
resolutions of the problem with a focus on the Ireland market.
Cox et al. (2013) minimize total funding variation while control-
ling expected total pension cost and funding downside risk. Alsosee Cairns (2013) for a review of the state-of-the-art models for
longevity risk, an important concern for pension plans. While in-
terested inmanaging pension risks, most of these papers do not fo-
cus on obtaining a direct measure of a pension sponsor’s risk. Even
when a risk measure can potentially be derived from a larger con-
text (such as from a constraint of an optimization problem), it does
not allow direct implementations that practitioners and regulators
are already familiar with. Our paper thus fills a gap in the literature
by developing such a measure from the sponsor’s perspective and
can inform the sponsor’s decision making process.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the risk drivers for pension plans and annuity products, fo-
cusing on how the insurance capital charge factors-based approach
can be applied to pension plans with necessary adjustments. In
Section 3, we describe our sample pension plan and illustrate the
insurance factor based approach for pension risk measurement.
In Section 4, we develop the simulation-based framework where
the factors are obtained by directly simulating the underlying risk
drivers. Section 5 presents sensitivity analysis to test for the ro-
bustness of the proposedmethodology. Section 6 discusses various
applications of our methodology and concludes the paper.
2. Pension plan and annuity risk drivers
Both annuity providers and pension plan sponsors promise
a stream of benefits to the beneficiaries after retirement in
exchange for current compensation, explicitly in the form of
premium payments or implicitly as deferred compensation.
Therefore, insurers and corporate sponsors share very similar
risks. Table 1 compares the risks laid out in the life insurance
regulatory framework for annuity products against pension plan
sponsors’ view of their risks (cf., National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, 2009). As can be seen,most of themajor categories
of risks, including longevity risk, investment risk, and interest rate
risk are shared among insurers and pension sponsors, with the
exception of the emerging operational risk. According to the AON
survey (Pension Benefits, 2010), most of the sponsors view interest
rate risk as their major risk with longevity risk being the second
most important.
Although annuity insurers and pension sponsors face similar
risks, they have traditionally adopted very different approaches
to managing these risks. This is probably due to the institutional
and regulatory differences between the insurers and the pension
sponsors. Life and annuity insurers are expected to be self-
sufficient in meeting their benefit obligations with all their assets
supporting this goal. In contrast, pension trusts have a corporate
sponsor that is expected to meet any obligations the trust cannot
afford. Therefore, not all resources that could be used to meet
pension obligations actually reside within the pension trust. The
insurers and the sponsors in the United States also differ in their
ability to use funds when adverse events do not occur. With
favorable experience, the insurer can redeploy capital no longer
required for the policies to support new businesses or make other
investments. Using pension assets for other needs of the sponsor,
on the contrary, is rarely permitted. Despite these differences, it is
equally important for sponsor firms to understand quantitatively
the amount of risk brought about by the pension plan. After all, the
corresponding amount of assets is at risk regardless residing in or
outside of the trust.
In order to maintain solvency and a desired credit rating,
insurers have focused on meeting the promised benefits and
have generally maintained asset levels to withstand all but the
most extreme events. For example, Standard and Poor’s capital
model for insurers is set so that non-speculative rated insurance
companies should have sufficient capital to remain solvent with
likelihoods of 97.2% to 99.9% over a one-year period (Standard
42 J. Ai et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 63 (2015) 40–51Table 1
Commonly perceived risks by insurers and pension sponsors.
Source: Standard and Poor’s Capital Model, 2010 Pension Risk Management Global Survey.
Risk type Insurance company description Pension plan description Pension sponsors’ view of
riska
Investment risk Default risk on fixed-income investments and market value risk on
equity type investments
Equity market 15%
Longevity risk Longevity risk Longevity 21%
Interest rate risk Interest rate and asset–liability management risk Interest rate 58%
Inflation 6%
Operational risk Operational risk Not mentioned in survey Not mentioned in survey
a Pension Benefits, ‘‘2010 Pension Risk Management Global Survey’’ June 2010, p. 10–11, www.aon.ca/pubs/PRPS/PensionRiskGlobalSurvey_Mar2010_ENG.pdf.Table 2
Standard and Poor’s capital level setting thresholds.
Source: Standard and Poor’s Capital Model (2010).
Capital level One-year confidence level
AAA 99.9%
AA 99.7%
A 99.4%
BBB 97.2%
and Poor’s, 2010). In Europe, the one-year threshold in Solvency II
requirements is set at 99.5%. This value-at-risk type of metric puts
emphasis on the tail risk of the insurers and is actively managed
by insurance companies to calculate and ensure sufficient capital
levels. Table 2 presents S&P’s one-year value-at-risk confidence
levels corresponding to different capital adequacy rating levels.
On the other hand, defined benefit pension plan sponsors have
traditionally been focusing primarily on the expected value of
benefit liability measures and expected returns on investments
in the pension plan trust.2 Generally, the liability measures are
managed by an actuary, usually an external consultant, and assets
are managed by external asset managers, resulting in further
asset–liability matching issues. The funding target is traditionally
a function of the actuarial assumptions, funding levels, and
investment policy. Actuarial assumptions for pension plans and
thus the funding levels of the trust are governed by a ‘‘best
estimate’’ approach focusing on the expected value, i.e., they are
designed so that future experience is not expected to be routinely
better or worse than the assumption (Actuarial Standards Board,
2007). Moreover, not only are the pension liabilities often not
calculated to providemargin for adverse experience, pension plans
often do not have assets in the trust to cover even the expected
liabilities. Milliman’s analysis of the one hundred largest corporate
defined benefit pension plans showed that those plans were 77.3%
funded as of the end of 2012 (Milliman, 2013), i.e., they had assets
equal to 77.3% of the accounting estimate of the plan’s benefit
liability. It is unclear if this funding level was a deliberate choice
or just due to the sponsors not knowing quantitatively the risk
inherent in the plan.
Despite the lack of adequate risk management focus, volatility
of pension cost is indeed an important concern for defined benefit
2 Although still lagging behind the life and annuities industry in many aspects,
sponsor risk has received more attention and new methods have been developed,
such as asset–liability management review projects and liability driven investing
and risk-budgeting techniques. In the meanwhile, there is a growing body of
academic literature studying different issues related to funding mechanisms and
asset allocations for pension plans, often based on a sophisticated optimization
framework. These approaches have not been widely adopted by the practitioners
perhaps due to the complex nature of the methodology and the computational
burden. The objective of this paper is to provide an easily implementable
methodology, much in the same vein as the capital factor approach widely
recognized by the insurers, which may provide the practitioners and regulators
with immediate access to the necessary information on the risk-taking of pension
plans. This paper does not attempt to provide an optimized level of funding from
the pension sponsor. Some recent working papers (e.g. Lin et al., 2014) started to
tackle this challenge.plan sponsors. A survey of large employers conducted by Towers
Watson, a large benefits consulting firm, showed that cost volatility
was a key issue for 52.1% employers that decided to close or
freeze their pension plan (Towers Watson, 2012a). The proposed
methodology in this paper can be used to measure the potential
size of this volatility and facilitate optimal decision-making.
In light of the shared set of risk exposures of insurers and
pension sponsors and their similar goals in managing these risks,
we translate the insurer’s capital charge factors-based approach
that calculates the total asset requirement to remain solvent over
a one-year period with a high level of confidence to determine
the amount of risk private pension sponsors face. We obtain a
similar total asset requirement for sustaining a privately sponsored
pension plan. The difference between the total asset requirement
and the actual assets in the trust is thus a measure of sponsor
assets at risk due to plan sponsorship. We develop two different
approaches for this riskmeasurementmethodology in thenext two
sections.
3. Applying the insurer factor approach to measuring pension
risk
3.1. Overview
Over the past decade, pension sponsors have become acutely
aware of pension risk and its implication for their profitability
and viability, giving rise to an increasing need for an easily
implementable measure of this risk. Because pension plans share
very similar risk drivers with insurance products such as group
annuities, to estimate pension risk we translate the capital-based
riskmeasurewidely used by life and annuity insurance companies,
i.e., the concept of Total Asset Requirement (TAR) that describes
the capital assets needed for a desired confidence level (American
Academy of Actuaries, 2007).3 From the perspective of a corporate
sponsor, we define the overall pension risk as the maximum
amount of sponsor assets outside the trust that may be called
upon tomeet pension obligations at a given (high) confidence level
over a one-year period, i.e., a Value-at-Risk type of risk measure.
This definition allows us to make a direct comparison between the
insurers and pension plans. Note that this risk measure is viewed
in terms of its capital requirement and is designed to provide a
gauge of risks imposed by a pension plan to the sponsors. While
this risk measure can be an important input into the sponsor’s
optimal decision making framework, it should not be viewed as a
direct indication of the amount of assets required in the trust fund.
Fig. 1 presents a comparison between the TAR decomposition for
insurers and pension sponsors.
3 For most insurers policy reserves comprise the lion’s share of total liabilities.
However,measurement of reserves and other liabilities for bothGAAP and statutory
accounting is formulaic, and once set is very difficult to change. Therefore, the lever
used to determine the adequacy of the asset base is the level of capital.
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Table 3
Sample pension plan specifications.
Plan status Frozen
Projected benefit obligation (PBO)
as of 12/31/2012
$100 million
PBO Discount Ratea 3.84%
PBO Mortalityb IRS static funding mortality table 2012
Assumed retirement age 62
Duration of benefits 15.2 years
Number of participants 1,184
Male/female mix 50%/50%
Assets in pension trust $ 80 million
Unfunded liabilities $ 20 million
a See Citigroup pension yield curve as of December 31, 2012.
b Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-85 (2008) October 20.
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2008-42_IRB/ar09.html.
In contrast to a traditional pension risk measure based on a
best point estimate of unfunded liability, the TAR-based measure
accounts for different risk drivers that contribute to pension
cost volatility and provide margins for adverse circumstances.
By comparing the TAR measure and the current assets in the
trust, the sponsors can obtain a clear indication of the quantity of
additional assets put at risk by sponsoring the plan. For example,
this amount could be compared against variousmeasurements of a
sponsor’s resources, such as earnings from core business activities
and the market value of equity. In doing such comparisons, it is
worth noting that depending on the nature of their businesses,
the scenarios that cause unusual stress on a pension plan may
cause stress on the sponsor’s resources at the same time. This
information is clearly essential for holistic enterprise planning.
Under the same conceptual framework for the capital factors,
we develop and illustrate two specific factor-based approaches
to estimate pension TAR. The first approach is to treat the
pension plan as a group annuity product offered by an insurer
(e.g., as happens in standard pension plan termination), thereby
applying directly the established insurer factors to the pension
plan based on specific plan parameters. We make necessary
adjustments recognizing that investment strategies and other
parameters can differ greatly between pension plans and insurers.
A second approach is to develop pension-specific factors by
directly simulating underlying risk drivers such as mortality
improvement, interest rate and equity returns volatilities and
obtaining possible funding statuses in one year. Once the factors
are developed, plan sponsors can use these factors directly instead
of having to frequently redo the simulations. We illustrate both
approaches with a realistic sample pension plan next and present
further analysis for robustness tests.
3.2. Sample pension plan
We design a sample pension plan to illustrate the proposed
approaches. We consider a frozen plan providing life annuity
benefits to retirees. Retirees can begin receiving full benefits atTable 4
Sample pension plan investments.
Asset class Value of investments (millions)
Fixed income (by security rating)
AAA, AA and A $ 25.5
BBB $ 6.5
Total fixed income $ 32.0
US equities $ 48.0
Total $ 80.0
age 65 or reduced benefits as early as age 55. We simplified the
assumptions to facilitate calculation. First, we assume all annuities
will be single life annuities and all participants will commence
their benefits at age 62. In addition, similar to the plan statistic
cited above, we assume our sample plan is funded to 80% of
the projected benefit obligation. Other specifications for the plan
are presented in Table 3. As evidence that our sample plan is a
reasonable example of a defined benefit pension plan, our plan has
a duration within 0.1 years of the Citigroup Pension Liability Index
— Intermediate plan and we calculate a single discount rate for the
sample plan 1 basis point higher than the same Citigroup Index
plan.4
Table 4 presents the plan’s investment allocations. For this
baseline case illustration, we assume that the plan invests in
a well-diversified portfolio with a 60% equity and 40% fixed-
income investment mix and no investments are in the sponsor
securities. The fixed-income portfolio is invested exclusively in
long-term debt with maturities of 20 years or more (to match the
long duration of pension liabilities) and is broken down by credit
quality.
3.3. Insurer factors-based approach
Life and annuity insurers constantly need to balance competing
needs for capital in light of their strategic goals, between
considerations such as starting new business, supporting riskier
investment strategies, increasing capital amounts to obtain higher
ratings and secure a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
Because of sensitivity of capital management for strategic and
regulatory purposes, the capital level and risk taking are regularly
monitored.
Consequently, insurers oftenmeasure their risk using the factor
approach, which is also largely supported by the regulators and
rating agencies.5 Under the factor approach, liabilities and assets
are charged a capital factor to represent the quantity of exposure
to perceived risk of various balance sheet and income statement
items. Each financial statement item is then multiplied by such a
factor to estimate the capital required to support the risk taking
and provide protection to policyholders at a given confidence
level.6
Similarly, we propose to develop such a set of factors for
pension plans to enable sponsors to monitor and manage a
plan’s risk level easily and inexpensively. The factor approach also
4 This is based on Citigroup pension yield curve as of December 31, 2012
and projected benefits paid by the sample plan. Citigroup rates can be found
at http://www.soa.org/professional-interests/pension/resources/pen-resources-
pension.aspx.
5 A good overview of the regulatory capital model can be found on the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners website.
http://naic.org/documents/committees_e_capad_RBCoverview.pdf.
6 Albeit an important capital management tool, factor approaches are not the
only technique used in capital management by insurers. Insurers often engage
in more sophisticated modeling efforts to supplement the factor approach in
determining the adequacy of their capital position. We present a simulation-based
approach for pension plans later in this paper.
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of the risk it is bearing. A pension sponsor can then estimate her
overall risk appetite and allocate it efficiently to various sources
of risk across the enterprise. This information could inform plan
design, investment policy, any annuity purchase decisions, and
can become a useful ingredient for a larger corporate decision
framework.
As a first pass, we directly take the insurer factors and apply
them, after making appropriate adjustments, to calculate pension
TAR. Due to its prevalence, we use the factors employed in the
Standard and Poor’s Capital Model for Life Insurers in the United
States. While the model allows for the use of either GAAP or
statutory accounting, we use an estimate of statutory reserves
in our calculations for its prudence. Different sets of factors are
available for achieving various ratings that correspond to TAR
requirements at differing confidence levels. We will calculate the
TAR for the highest possible rating of the sponsoring firm, AAA, and
the A rating, a commonly expected rating for insurance companies.
As shown in Table 2, the corresponding one-year confidence levels
are 99.9% and 99.4%, respectively.7
Note that we use two separate concepts of ratings in this paper.
One is the credit rating of a firm corresponding to maintaining
sufficient capital for a desired confidence level. The other is the
bond rating used in investment allocation decisions. They both
relate to an obligor’s ability to pay its obligations. For a life and
annuity company the credit rating describes its ability to pay on
its obligations to policyholders. We use this rating in the concept
of capital because for a given level of risk the larger the capital
layer is the more likely the insurer is able to weather adverse
events and pay policyholders. The bond ratings, on the other hand,
are used to assess the investment risks insurers or pension plans
take on. An insurer that owns an AAA rated bond is taking on less
investment risk than one owning a BBB rated bond and thus less
capital is required to sustain this risk for the sameoverall insurance
company credit rating.
Next, we make adjustments for calculating pension liabilities
and describe each risk driver of pension cost volatility, namely
longevity risk, investment risk, interest rate risk, and operational
risk.We also discuss any necessary adjustmentswhen applying the
corresponding insurance factors to the pension plan.
3.3.1. Liability adjustments
One of the most important risk drivers for pension sponsors
are benefit obligations owing to possible longevity improvement
and interest rate fluctuations. Statutory reserves used by insurance
companies for a similar set of benefit obligations are intended to be
more conservative than a ‘‘best estimate’’ of the policy’s liability.
Accordingly, we make two adjustments to the projected benefit
obligation as if we were estimating the statutory reserve for a
group annuity in order to obtain its contribution to the pension
TAR. Specifically, we change the discount rate assumption and
use a different mortality assumption. Note that we are making
these adjustments merely for TAR calculations, not for funding or
accounting purposes for the pension plan.
We assume that for 2012 the interest rate prescribed for
reserving group annuities is 4.25% (Towers Watson, 2012b) for
participants currently in payout status and 3.75% for participants
whose benefits are deferred. For the sample plan the single
equivalent rate of these two rates is approximately 3.85%. This
is one basis point above the discount rate used to calculate the
7 A pension sponsor may not desire such a high confidence level due to the fact
that assets outside of the trust can serve as a buffer in adverse scenarios. We only
chose these confidence levels to make easy comparisons with the insurers but one
can certainly adjust the confidence levels under the proposed approaches.Fig. 2. Benefit payment patterns.
pension benefit obligations (PBO). This outcome is unusual and
due to the difference in timing of when these rates were set
for December 2012. Had we done this calculation at the end of
2010 the reserving interest rate would have been 78 basis points
lower than the interest rate calculated using the Citigroup pension
discount rates. Holding all other assumptions constant, the liability
for the pension plan at these two reserve interest rates would be
$99.8 million. We use the Society of Actuaries 94GAR table instead
of the IRS Static Funding Mortality Table to obtain the prescribed
reserve mortality for the group annuities. The 94GAR table is a
generational table based on the Society of Actuaries study in 1994.
This change of table in mortality assumptions results in increased
liability (at the 3.85% discount rate) of $4.4 million. We show in
Fig. 2 the expected benefit payments from the pension plan using
the two alternative mortality assumptions. The only difference
between the two curves is the mortality rate.
Note that generational tables reflect anticipated improvements
in mortality experience so the rate of deaths at each age changes
from year to year. For example, individuals who are now in their
20s are expected to have lower mortality rates in their 50s than
individuals who are currently in their 50s due to mortality im-
provement over the next 30 years. Therefore, the use of genera-
tional tables helps address concerns in longevity improvements
when estimating pension liabilities. Table 5 provides a summary
of impacts on pension liabilities of the two assumption changes.
Other methods for modeling longevity improvements can
certainly be incorporated to make adjustments to the estimated
pension liabilities. A large literature is available on modeling
longevity and mortality risks. For example, see the Lee–Carter
framework and its extensions by Brouhns et al. (2002), Lin and
Cox (2005) and Denuit et al. (2007). Later works also address
mortality and longevity jumps, for example, see Chen and Cox
(2009), Bauer et al. (2010), and Cox et al. (2010). In addition, Kisser
et al. (2012) provides the first empirical assessment of the impact
of life expectancy assumptions on the liabilities of private US
defined benefit (DB) pension plans using the Form 5500 data from
1995 to 2007. See Cairns (2013) for a review of the state-of-the-
art stochastic models for the measurement and management of
longevity risk. The use of these methods will change our estimated
pension liabilities butwill not change the rationale of the proposed
factor approach to TAR calculations and the pension risk measure.
We now proceed to describe each of the risk drivers and obtain
respective capital requirements by applying the corresponding
insurance factors.
3.3.2. Investment risk
Pension assets are often invested in fixed income securities
and equities. These investments are subject to credit/default risk,
market risk, and interest rate risk. We discuss the measurement
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Pension ‘‘reserve’’ calculation.
Assumptions Amounts in millions
Interest rates Mortality table Adjustment Pension liability
Initial liability (PBO) Pension accounting (3.84%) IRS Table $100.0
Adjusted for interest rates Reserving (3.85%) IRS table ($0.2)
Adjusted for GAR 94 mortality table Reserving (3.85%) 94 GAR $ 4.4
Estimated ‘‘reserve’’ Reserving (3.85%) 94 GAR $104.2Table 6
Capital charges for investments.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Capital Model (2010).
Asset type NAIC rating Equivalent Standard and Poor’s ratingsa S&P AAA factor S&P A factor
Bonds
1 AAA, AA, A 2.34% 2.01%
2 BBB 6.10% 5.77%
3 BB 27.82% 25.14%
Equities N/A N/A 47.00% 38.00%
a See the ‘‘NAIC ARO Rating Equivalent to SVO Designations’’ by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (0000) for mapping the NAIC categories into the S&P
ratings, available at http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_naic_aro.pdf.and capital requirement of the first two exposures in this section
and leave the discussions of interest rate risk to a later section.
Fixed income securities are classified into seven categories
based on the default probabilities by insurance regulators (NAIC)
and rating agencies such as S&P. The S&P factors also vary by the
maturity of the bonds. A risk factor is assigned to each type of
investment to calculate the corresponding capital charge. Table 6
presents capital charges for bonds with maturities for 20 years or
greater as well as charges for equity investments owned by our
sample pension plan.
We used the long maturity charges because the sponsor may
want to match themwith the long duration of pension obligations.
Although our sample plan has no bonds in the NAIC 3 class, we
showed those charges for illustrative purposes. We can see that
the charges for the equity investments are significantly higher than
those of the fixed income securities.Wepresent the factors for both
S&P AAA rated insurers and S&P A rated insurers. Capital charges
for AAA rated insurers are higher than A rated insurers because
they are supposed to be able to withstand a more extreme set
of adverse circumstances. Based on our investment allocation in
Table 4 and factors in Table 6,we calculate the capital requirements
for our sample pension plan and present them in Table 7.
3.3.3. Longevity risk
The second set of capital charges is intended to cover the risk
that insurance products claims experience ismateriallyworse than
anticipated. From the vantage point of a pension plan, this risk class
is comparable to the demographic experience being worse than
expected, i.e., longevity risk. For a pension plan with life annuity
benefits, longevity is amajor risk exposure. Another related pricing
risk for a pension plan is when retirement patterns do not meet
expectations, particularly if early retirement benefits are heavily
subsidized.
Because reserving by life insurers is intended to be conservative
by nature, the S&P model does not require capital charges for
longevity above this measure in the United States. Therefore, we
do not apply a specific factor here under this approach. However,
we have partly accounted for the longevity risk exposure by using a
more conservativemortality assumption in calculating the pension
liabilities. This change caused the liability to increase by 4%. By
contrast, in our simulation-based approach to factor development,
we do consider longevity risk as one of the major risk drivers
and design a pension-specific longevity risk factor toward TAR
calculations.3.3.4. Interest rate risk
The third risk category of capital charges is interest rate risk.
Pension plan sponsors are very familiar with the impact of interest
rates on measured pension liabilities. In contrast to the annual
resetting of discount rates that impacts pension plan liabilities,
reserves for insurance products do not change with interest rates
after they are sold. However, the products are still subject to
interest rate risk. For a group annuity the key risk is that interest
rates will drop below assumed reinvestment rates by a sufficient
margin and for long enough that the assets will be insufficient to
pay the benefits.
To test the adequacy of reserves with respect to potential
changes in interest rates and inflation, a series of stress tests is
performed. These tests, referred to as cash flow testing, simulate
the actual assets and liability cash flows over much or all of a
product’s life span. As assets mature, they are reinvested at yields
assumed in the simulations. If the reserves for the company’s
products exhibit risks of being insufficient, reserve levels are
required to be increased above the formulaic reserves. Therefore,
any capital charges for interest rate risk are for risk above these
reserve calculations.
The capital charges for group annuities in the S&P model are
4.3% at the AAA level and 3.5% at the A level. The factors are applied
to reserve levels to obtain the capital charges. For our sample plan,
that translates into $4.5million and $3.6million for the two capital
adequacy levels.
3.3.5. Operational risk
The final category of risk drivers is operational risk. This nascent
risk category is a ‘‘catch-all’’ for the risk that internal or outside
force causes operational impediments to execute an insurance
company’s business plan. In the pension environment, operational
failures could include material benefit calculation errors or losses
due to fraud or theft. The S&P model applies the capital charge for
this risk to reserves and is 0.20% of reserves at either the AAA or the
A capital levels. For our sample plan, this amounts to $0.2 million.
Table 8 presents a summary of capital charges for interest rate risk
and operational risk.
3.3.6. Unspecified assets
For life and annuity insurers, the assets that make up the TAR
reside entirely within the insurance company and thus it is easy
to determine the assets considered and the appropriate capital
factors. However, this may not be true for a pension plan. Only
assets in the trust are specified for the pension plan. The remaining
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Investment charges for sample pension plan.
Assets (A) (B) C= (A) * (B) (D) (E)= (A) * (D)
Amount invested (Millions) AAA charges Required AAA capital A charges Required A capital
NAIC 1 bonds $25.5 2.34% $0.6 2.01% $0.5
NAIC 2 bonds $ 6.5 6.10% $0.4 5.77% $0.4
Equities $48.0 47.00% $22.6 38.00% $18.2
Total $80.0 $23.6 $19.1Table 8
Capital charge for interest rate risk and operational risk.
(A) (B) C= (A) * (B) (D) (E)= (A) * (D)
Reserves AAA factor AAA charges A factor A charges
Interest rate risk $104.2 MM 4.3% $4.5 MM 3.5% $3.6 MM
Operational risk $104.2 MM 0.2% $0.2 MM 0.2% $0.2 MMTable 9
Unspecified asset capital charge.
Item AAA capital amount
(millions)
Calculations
Reserves 104.2
Capital for previous risks and
assets
28.3 23.6+ 4.5+ 0.2
Preliminary asset target 132.5
Assets already available 80.0
Preliminary shortfall 52.5
Required additional assets to
meet shortfall plus capital
charges on these assets
55.9 52.5/(100%− 6.1%)
Capital charges on these
additional assets
3.4 55.9 * 6.1%
TAR balance is a claim against the corporate sponsor. Because there
is a possibility that the sponsor may not be able to make good on
this claim, a charge for market and default risk should be applied
to the claim on sponsor assets too.
Because pension deficits are often considered debt-like obliga-
tions for a sponsor, one approach to calculating capital charges for
unspecified assets is to treat the unfunded TAR as an unsecured
debt obligation of the sponsor. The capital charges in the S&Pmodel
depend on the credit quality and maturity of the debt. We use the
sponsor’s overall credit rating in determining the charge to the
unspecified sponsor assets and use the longest maturity capital
charges to reflect the long-term nature of pension plan sponsor-
ship.
Since this capital charge will impact both the TAR as well as the
level of unspecified assets to which this factor is applied, we use a
recursive formula to calculate the TAR:
UA = (R+ OCC − TA)/(1− C),
whereUA=Unspecified Assets, R= Reserves,OCC =Other Capital
Charges, TA = Trust Assets, and C = Capital charge factor for
unspecified assets.
Assuming the sample pension plan sponsor’s unsecured debt
rating is BBB, we present the development of this capital charge
for an AAA capital adequacy level in Table 9. A similar calculation
would arrive at the charge for an A capital level.
One issue is that it is difficult to diversify the ‘‘unspecified
assets’’ measured here for the pension plans. They are generally
the obligation of one entity. On the contrary, the assets of a life
insurer would bewell diversified or be subject to additional capital
charges to account for the lack of diversification. Because we are
attempting to measure the risk of the plan to the sponsor, we have
not increased this charge to address (lack of) diversification. If
another entity, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty CorporationTable 10
Summary of pension TAR (millions).
Required asset
level
Source of number S&P AAA S&P A
Table 5 Estimated reserves $104.2 $104.2
Capital requirements by risk
Table 7 – Default and market risk $23.6 $19.1
– Pricing risk 0.0 0.0
Table 8 – Interest rate risk 4.5 3.6
Table 8 – Operational risk 0.2 0.2
Table 9 – Unspecified asset charge 3.4 3.1
Sum of above Total capital $31.7 $26.0
Reserves+ capital Total asset requirement $135.9 $130.2
Table 3 Assets in trust 80.0 80.0
Difference Company assets at risk $55.9 $50.2
(PBGC)8 or plan participants, is measuring the risk of the plan, an
adjustment may then be appropriate.
Combining the adjusted pension liabilities in Table 5 and capital
charges for the four major risk drivers in Tables 6–9, we obtain the
TAR for the sample pension plan for the S&P AAA and A capital
levels and present the development in Table 10. The difference of
the TAR and the assets current available in the trust thus provides a
measure for sponsors’ assets at risk, i.e., our pension risk measure.
We have focused on the downside of pension experience in
this analysis. However, there may be cases where the pension
plan experience is favorable. If the favorable experience is due
to reduced liabilities, both the liabilities and associated capital
chargeswould be reduced. Even experience anticipated in themain
pension valuation will have this impact, because this experience
would, in fact, be better than the reserving assumptions and
therefore reduce reserves and associated charges. If investment
returns are better than expected, the charges may increase as
base asset values increase. However, the overall sponsor assets at
risk would decrease because the investment charges would not
increase nearly as quickly as the improved funding level of the plan.
4. A simulation-based framework for capital factor develop-
ment
In order tomake the total asset requirement framework and the
capital factor approach more relevant to pension plan sponsors,
in this section we adapt both concepts to the unique realities
of defined benefit plans and specifically develop a set of factors
for these plans instead of borrowing the insurance factors. This
8 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a US Federal Government agency
that insures the benefits of certain defined benefit plans in exchange for premiums
paid to the agency by the covered plans. More can be learned at www.pbgc.gov.
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estimating possible deficits for a pension plan one year out. We
then determine a total asset requirement from those simulated
results. Finally we determine capital charge factors for each
risk driver by adapting, with modification, a capital allocation
methodology developed byBodoff (2009) for property and casualty
insurers.9
Weuse the Society of Actuaries/AmericanAcademyof Actuaries
Economic Scenario Generator for the ease of simulations and to
avoid making ad-hoc and impractical assumptions that may fail
to comply with regulatory standards.10 The generator develops
interest rate and equity returns scenarios. We ran our sample
plan through 10,000 scenarios. Based on the simulated interest
rates one year out we revalued the liabilities and the fixed income
portfolio. The equity returns allowed us to value the equity
portfolio at that same point in time.
We also developed a longevity simulator to account for the im-
portant risk of mortality improvements using the mortality im-
provement AA and BB scales by the Society of Actuaries (2000,
2012). The AA scale was originally developed for use with the GAR
1994 table and was recommended for continued use beyond 2000
with the RP-2000 mortality tables. Scale BB is being developed by
an ongoing initiative recognizing unaccounted mortality improve-
ments in most age groups by Scale AA. We are using the avail-
able interim Scale BB in our analysis. We model that in most cases
no improvement occurs but in some cases multiple year jumps in
the mortality table are simulated. This is consistent with the re-
ality of longevity improvements resulted from medical and tech-
nology breakthroughs. For example, Johnson et al. (2005) noted
that ‘‘a large longevity jump could occur in the future if an effec-
tive treatment of coronary heart disease and cancer were found, as
these two causes of death combined constitute more than half of
all deaths among people over the age of 40 (Johnson et al., 2005, p.
109)’’. The parameters of our model are in Table 11.
As previously discussed, one can elect to base longevity risk
simulations on other more sophisticatedmodels. Abundant papers
in the recent literature study longevity risk modeling (cf. Cairns,
2013). A thorough investigation of these models is beyond the
scope of our paper as we are mainly interested in how to develop
a longevity risk factor and how to incorporate it in the TAR
calculations for pension plan sponsors. Using these alternative
9 One drawback of adapting the Bodoff (2009) method (and hence of our
approach as presented herein) is that we have not explicitly modeled the
correlations between different risk drivers in our presented simulations. The lack
of correlation between the longevity risk driver and the fixed income driver and
the equity return driver is reasonable, however general economic conditions (such
as increasing interest rate environments) affect both fixed income and equity
return drivers in opposite ways making these two economic drivers behave in a
negatively correlated manner. Correlations between those risk drivers will also
impact developing the allocations (i.e., the deviation from the expected, as will
be explained later) to each individual risk driver. More sophisticated methods
of allocations that account for correlations may be developed within our model
framework by developing a simulation model that creates a bivariate simulation
for the equity risk driver and the fixed income driver that reproduces their means,
variances, and skewnesses for the two driver variables along with their inner-
correlation. These jointly simulated return drivers are then used simultaneously in
the computation as described for the independence case herein. In the interest of
space preservation and to keep the model presentation conceptually simpler and
easier to follow, however, we do not pursue this extension in this paper. The details
of the bivariate simulation model are available from the authors upon request.
10 The scenarios generator is jointly developed by the American Academy of
Actuaries and the Society of Actuaries (SOA) for simulating interest rate, equity
returns and other related scenarios in applications such as regulatory reserve and
capital calculations. It is in compliance with NAIC criteria and is widely used by life
and pension actuaries. We use the generator here for the ease of implementation.
However, other simulation tools can be used without affecting the validity of
our approach. The generator is available at http://www.soa.org/research/software-
tools/research-scenario.aspx.Table 11
Longevity simulation parameters.
Simulated event Probability of occurrence
No Change 90.0%
5 years of AA scale improvement 2.5%
15 years of AA scale improvement 2.5%
5 years of BB scale improvement 2.5%
15 years of BB scale improvement 2.5%
models may result in different simulation results but does not
change the underlying rationale and structure of our simulation-
based factor development approach. Due to limited robustness of
some models, one should perhaps employ and test a variety of
models and assumptions in developing these factors before they
can be used with confidence.
As we can see from Table 11, on average the improvement
in the year is one year of the average between the AA and BB
scales. We allow for significant variation in the results to provide
one-year stress events to the funding status of the sample plan.
It also mimics the way mortality tables are reflected in pension
funding practice. Traditionally sponsors and their actuaries only
change tables periodically when evidence suggests a change is
appropriate. Many years can pass between changes and when a
change is made many years of improvement are reflected in that
change at once. In our simulations, to determine which occurrence
happened for each simulation, a random number was generated
for each of the 10,000 scenarios and from that number one of the
above scenarios was applied. If one of the scenarios with mortality
rate changes was selected, the benefit flows in years 2 and beyond
would reflect the new mortality assumption.
In order to directly simulate the impact of interest rates on
both liabilities and fixed-income assets we made assumptions
regarding the stream of cash flows from the fixed-income
portfolio. We model the interest rates by simulating treasury
rates in the generator and then add back the initial spread of
the Citigroup pension discount curve above treasury rates. The
scenario generator develops potential yield curves one year out.
We then add back the initial spread to simulate the AA curve. Our
fixed income investments’ market values are assumed to move
along with those simulated curves.
In our simulations-based approach, we focused on interest rate,
equity returns and longevity and did not simulate operational risk
or credit risk. These last two risks were not perceived as major
risks by sponsors as shown in Table 1. Also, in the S&P capital
calculations above they contributed only a modest amount of
capital. Therefore, we focus on modeling the most important risk
drivers that sponsors are most concerned about.
Based on our sample pension plan and the aforementioned
assumptions, we model the impact of longevity risk, interest rate
risk and equity returns on the plan’s funded status one year out
by simulations. We calculate the ending deficit at the end of the
year for each simulation and present the cumulative distribution
function of the present value of deficits in Fig. 3. Aswe can see there
is a wide dispersion of possible deficits. The average simulated
ending deficit was $20.6 million and recall that the initial deficit
was $20 million. In fact for the 10,000 simulations, 5,431 had
deficits greater than $20 million.
Table 12 presents the value-at-risk (VaR) and tail value-at-
risk (TVaR) measures of the tail risk for the funding deficit
at different confidence levels. These measures illustrate the
difference between themodeled deficit and the initial deficit. They
demonstrate that the ending deficit for our plan one year out can
be significantly different than the starting deficit.
The 99.4% VaR metric, consistent with the S&P A capital ad-
equacy level considered in previous analysis, corresponds to the
61stworst scenariowithin our 10,000 simulations. This amounts to
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Table 12
Tail event statistics.
Percentile VaR (in $ millions) TVaR (in $ millions)
50% 0.914 7.390
80% 7.636 12.364
95% 14.425 18.209
99.4% 22.268 25.449
$22.268 million of sponsor assets at risk above the $20 million ini-
tial deficit, which is clearly a substantive concern for the sponsor.
Now that we have simulated the potential deficits and deter-
mined the additional sponsor assets at risk, we develop the set of
capital charge factors for each of the risk drivers. These factors will
allow for an explanation of the causes of the overall deficit as well
as can be used to estimate the risk inherent in other plans or if this
plan were to change its risk exposures. We adopt a method devel-
oped by Bodoff (2009) for determining the factors. Bodoff (2009)
developed this method as a way to allocate capital between gen-
eral insurance products with differing risk profiles. Unlike other
methods focusing on the insolvency of insurers and thus the ex-
treme loss events only, his allocation reflected both the risk of se-
rious losses as well as less severe but more frequent losses.11
Following the Bodoff approach, we use our simulated losses and
the drivers for each loss to allocate each ‘‘layer’’ of capital up to the
desired level. We determine each risk driver’s contribution to the
ending deficits by allocating the amount of total deficit to the risk
drivers in proportion to its individual deviation from its median.
Note that in the context of property and casualty insurance losses
in Bodoff’s work, the losseswere all ‘‘oneway’’, i.e., losses indicated
11 Myers and Read (2001) is another well-known and sophisticated capital
allocation method in the insurance literature. Under their option pricing method
based approach, capital is allocated to different lines of insurance business based on
each line’s marginal contribution to the overall corporate default value in the sense
that marginal capital allocation to each line adds up to the aggregate economic
capital needed to ensure a target default rate (also as implied by a credit rating).We
did not use this approach for the following reasons. First, for insurance companies
the point of insolvency can be determined with some certainty. That point for
pension plans, however, is less clear because the sponsor can backstop drops in
the pension funding level. A comparablemodel frameworkmay be proposedwhere
the sponsor goes bankrupt when the plan is underfunded. Since the primary goal
of our paper is to develop a measure of the risk of the pension plan, adding non-
pension specific risks and issues may distract from our man contribution. Second,
Myers andRead (2001) focus on a specific industry, i.e., insurance companies,whose
business is largely homogeneous. Therefore, they clearly define their analysis at
the insurance line of business level, which bears a natural separation between
one another. Therefore, it is natural to discuss adding a new line of business or
exiting a line of existing business and its ‘‘marginal’’ impact on the total surplus
requirement. On the other hand, we aggregate our analysis at the level of major risk
exposures that can be commonly driven bymany underlying risk factors. Therefore,
a transition fromMyers and Read (2001) framework to our proposed framework is
beyond the scope of this paper.Fig. 4. Causes of deficit funding deviation worst 50 scenarios.
claims onpolicies.Whenwearemodeling thepension sponsor risk,
however, the risk drivers can actually raise or lower the funding
deficit amount depending on the realized outcomes. We adjust
the Bodoff method to reflect this consideration. In many cases one
or two of the drivers’ experience is better than expected and the
remaining driver(s) are responsible for the full deficit, though the
deficit would be less than the deviation from the expected for that
particular driver. This exemplifies the diversification of the risk
drivers. In these cases the amount of deficit is allocated only to the
drivers causing the deficit.
To develop the factors we only consider the overall adverse
states of funding, i.e., those simulations that fall below the median
funding level over all simulated scenarios. For each scenario we
determine for each driver the difference of the realized value from
the expected value using the metrics in Table 13. If the difference
was actually better than expected the deviation for that driver was
set to zero. Using thismethodologywe calculated for the fiftyworst
scenarios the deficit below the median level with an indication of
each driver’s respective contribution to the deficit in Fig. 4. The
actual allocation of capital to each risk driver is shown in the third
row of Table 13.
As we can see from Fig. 4 that all three risk drivers contribute
to the adverse funding deficits although equity return seems to be
the dominant force for the most extreme cases. Eleven of the fifty
scenarios have a longevity event including two of the three worst
scenarios. Based on our assumptionswewould have expected only
5 of the 50 scenarios on average to have longevity events. Longevity
does appear to be an important cause of the tail events along with
interest rates and equity returns.
Now that we have allocated the capital to the risk drivers, we
need to determine an appropriate exposure base for each driver to
calculate the capital charge factors. To tackle thiswe developed the
following metrics as summarized in Table 13. The equity exposure
is calculated as the dollar amount of equity investments. This
appears to be a clear metric as it is both easily identified and a
key driver of volatile returns. For interest rate risk we determined
the most appropriate measure was the dollar duration of the
benefit flownot covered by the fixed income investments. Changes
in interest rates will impact the liability as well as the market
value of fixed income investments. The funding deficit will be
driven by the net impact of those two items. Therefore, this metric
provides direct exposure of the plan to interest rates. An exposure
metric to longevity risk was not immediately clear. The exposure
is a function describing how the changes in longevity impact the
amount and length over which benefits are paid. It also matters
when that change occurs. Increased benefits several decades out
have less impact as those are severely discounted to develop the
current liability. We settled on using the liability measure as the
exposure amount.
Finally we divide the allocated capital amount by the exposure
metric to obtain the factors for each of the three risk drivers.
Pension sponsors can then use these factors directly for their plans
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Pension risk factors from simulations.
Equity Longevity Interest rates
Exposure metric Dollars invested Present value of liabilities Dollar duration of benefits less fixed income cash flows
Exposure amount 48,000,000 100,000,000 11,526,387
Scaled sum of deviations to 99.4 risk of ruin 16,955,867 807,574 3,847,175
Factor for A rating 35.32% 0.81% 33.38%
Percentile rank of deviation within risk driver 98.6% 89.8% 94.1%Table 14
Comparison of capital factors.
Risk driver Exposure S&P A factor Simulation factor
Equity exposures Equity investment 38.00% 35.32%
Interest rate Reserve liability amount 3.50% 3.69%
Longevity Reserve liability amount 0.00% 0.78%without having to go through the simulations exercise again. These
factors are presented in Table 13.
We can see from Table 13 that interest rate risk requires the
highest capital charge as evident by a large factor. This illuminates
the risk many plans have taken by not funding the benefit cash
flows with fixed income cash flows. Longevity risk, although a
long-term rather than short-term concern, is also awarded with
a non-trivial factor for the capital charge. Table 13 also shows
the percentile ranks on the scales of their own risk distributions
corresponding to the capital amount allocated to each risk driver.
We observe clear diversification effects as the individual risk
drivers were not evaluated as far into the tails as they jointly are.
This illustrates the importance of considering the three risk drivers
simultaneously.
Table 14 compares the simulation-based pension-specific
factors with the S&P capital charge factors for insurers. Note that
we have adjusted the interest rate and mortality exposures to
reserve liability amounts for comparison purposes. The S&P factor
for interest rate risk is applied to the liability while our factor was
applied to the dollar duration of the benefits less fixed income
cash flows. Therefore, if we scale the 33.38% factor originally
applied to the $11,526,387 exposure (as in Table 13) in order to
apply to the 104.2 million reserve liability, we would obtain an
equivalent factor of 3.69% that can be directly compared to the
corresponding S&P factor. After this adjustment, we can see that
these two sets of factors clearly resemble each other, providing an
external validation for our proposed simulation based-factors.
As will be discussed subsequently, the factors are also fairly
robust to plans with different characteristics. A pension sponsor
can thus choose to use either set of factors for determining the
sources of the funding risk over a one-year period and estimating
the total asset requirement (and their assets at risk) for the
enterprise decision making process. They can also follow the
simulation-based approach to develop their own set of factors,
should the characteristics of their plans deviate significantly from
our assumptions.
5. Sensitivity analysis
A unique advantage of the proposed capital factor approaches is
the relatively efficient and costless implementations in practice. In
order to achieve that, the set of factors should provide a reasonable
estimate for the TAR for a large number of plans that may differ in
the investment makeup or participant characteristics. This would
allow sponsor firms and/or regulators to apply a well-developed
set of factors to different plans and compare the risks of those
plans.
To test the robustness of the proposed factors, we develop three
test plans with characteristics different than the sample plan. Two
of these plans have meaningful changes from the sample planTable 15
Exposures for sample and test pension plans.
Equity Mortality Interest rate
Sample plan 48,000,000 100,000,000 11,526,387
Five years older 48,000,000 100,000,000 9,874,563
50% equity 40,000,000 100,000,000 10,484,883
0% equity – 100,000,000 5,277,371
in either the mortality rates or investment allocations. The third
has a dramatic change in both the investments and interest rate
exposures from the sample plan. The three test plans are described
below.
Test Plan 1 — five years older: This test plan illustrates changes in
participant characteristics. The participant group in this test plan is
5 years older than in the sample plan. Benefit amounts are adjusted
so that the Pension Benefit Obligation remains $100 million. This
change shortens the duration of the benefit flows and reduces the
plan’s exposures to changes in longevity due to the older starting
age of the participants. The fixed income portfolio is adjusted to
meet the first year benefits and an even proportion of benefits in
years 2 through 30. The present value of the fixed income portfolio
remains $32 million.
Test Plan 2 — 50% equity: This test plan illustrates changes in
investment allocations. The participant group and benefit flow
remain the same as the sample plan. The investments are adjusted
to reduce equity allocations and now the plan is evenly invested in
equities and fixed income securities. Therefore, risks from equity
return volatilities are reduced. It also has the effect of reducing
net exposure to interest rate changes, i.e., reducing the amount
of benefit cash flows not directly offset by the fixed income
investments.
Test Plan 3 — 0% equity: This test plan represents a dramatic change
to a plan with extremely conservative investment policies. As with
the 50% Equity plan, the participant group and benefit flow remain
the same as the sample plan. In this plan, all investments are in
fixed income securities. This test plan allows us to examine the
factors and risk drivers if one risk driver (equity risk driver in this
case) is removed completely.
Using these three test plans, we perform a series of robustness
tests. The first test is to determine the test plans’ exposures to the
different risk drivers as previously done for the sample pension
plan. This is trivial for all but the interest rate driver. Recall that
we define the interest rate exposure as the dollar duration of the
benefit flow less the fixed income cash flows. The exposures for the
three test plans are shown in Table 15.
We then ran each of these test plans through the same 10,000
simulations as the sample plan. We calculate from the simulation
results the expected deficit at the end of the year and the 99.4% VaR
from that deficit. The ‘‘actual’’ VaRs for each of the test plans are
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Comparing accuracy of initial factors for alternative pension plans.
Estimated VaR Actual VaR Expected deficit
Sample plan 21,610,616 21,610,616 20,657,064
Five years older 21,059,571 21,476,844 19,330,033
50% equity investment 18,437,318 18,957,711 21,121,007
0% Equity investment 2,569,161 6,281,588 23,440,722
comparedwith the ones estimated using the proposed simulation-
based factors in Table 14 and the test plan exposures in Table 15.
These comparisons are presented in Table 16.
Table 16 shows that the factors developed from the sample plan
provide good estimates of the VaR for the first two test plans. In
both cases the factors calculated a VaR within 3% of the actual
VaR. This is encouraging since each of the two test plans involves
material differences in participant characteristics or investment
policies from the sample plan.
The application to the plan with no equity investments was not
as successful. The factor approach did pick up the dramatic drop
in risk that is apparent from the simulations, although there is a
difference between the actual VaR from the direct simulations and
the estimated VaR from applying the factors. Removing one of the
drivers is laying bare risk on interest rates that was partially diver-
sified away in the plans with significant equity exposures. For the
original sample planwe have calculated the correlations of the risk
drivers as well as correlations of the contributions to the deficits
for scenarioswith ending deficits that are greater than average. Ta-
ble 17 shows these results. The correlations between the three risk
drivers are fairly small, essentially zero, per our current assump-
tions. Therefore, in general there are good diversification effects
between the drivers. Not surprisingly, however, in the more ad-
verse scenarios, more than one driver often have negative experi-
ence. That experience caused the correlations of the differentials of
the drivers (i.e., adverse experience manifested in each of the risk
drivers) to be much higher. Low equity returns, low interest rates
andmortality improvement all correlate with higher deficits of the
pension plan.
We also recalculate the sets of factors for each of the test plans
and compare them to those developed from the sample plan. We
expect the factors calculated from the first two test plans to be
largely similar to our proposed factors but the factors from the
third test plan to be dramatically different.
The factors reported in Table 18 confirm our hypotheses. This
is again suggesting that our proposed factors are fairly robust
and can potentially be applied to a large set of pension plans
with moderate changes from the sample plan. However, one
should be cautious when applying the proposed factors directly
to a plan with dramatically different characteristics.12 As shown
in Table 18, removing equity risk from the plan reduced the
diversification of the other risks and hence the impact of the other
two factors to each unit of exposure is much higher. The actual risk
dropped because the amount of exposure to interest rates dropped
materially and exposure to equities completely disappeared.
Note that changes in the plan characteristics (and hence the
specific simulation assumptions) will not change the rationale
12 One potential precaution for the presented factors is as follows. Since fixed
income and equities returns tend to have a fairly stable and negative correlation
for the reasons we understand related to the impacts of changing interest-
rate, (and longevity risk should be more or less uncorrelated with economic
variables), intuitively the pension portfolio with the three risk drivers with their
inner correlations considered would have lower variability or VaR than one
with three similarly marginally distributed variables but which are independent.
Thus, VaR calculated under the independence assumption should be larger (more
conservative) than the VaR calculated incorporating the correlations. The calculated
factors and the estimated VaR will change according to different correlations
assumptions deemed appropriate for the specific risk profiles.or applicability of the proposed capital factor approaches. Even
when the proposed factors cannot be applied directly, the sponsor
just need to adjust the specific simulations to reflect the actual
plan characteristics and can still follow our proposed factor
development approaches to develop a set of factors. The factors can
then be applied directly when reevaluating the plan later or when
minor to moderate changes have been made to the plan.
6. Practical applications and conclusions
In this paper,we aimat developing ameasure of private pension
sponsors’ risk by estimating a total assets requirement (TAR) for
pension plans, which can be easily implemented in practice to
monitor the risk levels for a large number of pensionplans. Inspired
by the economic capital models for insurers, the pension TAR
measure captures the amount of sponsor assets that can be called
upon in adverse risk scenarios and can be calculated using a factor
approach to capital charges. Such a TARmeasure can be very useful
in various aspects of a pension sponsor’s enterprise decision-
making process.
First, pension sponsors can use the TAR measure to easily
evaluate investment strategies for the plans and for the overall
corporate portfolio. For example, pension plans have traditionally
held significant amounts of equities for higher returns and
incentives provided by accounting rules. In our illustrative
example above, if the sponsor changes the investment strategy to
invest only in long-term bonds with the same allocation of bond
quality, the market risk capital charges would drop due to the
move from equities to investment grade bonds. However, for GAAP
pension accounting, the sponsor would also need to lower their
long-term rate of return assumption by, say, 3% a year. The new
investment strategywill have a clear impact on the sponsor’s assets
at risk, as shown in Table 19.
Second, the TAR and sponsors’ assets at risk measures can
be used in important strategic planning. For example, these
measures can facilitate decisions toward the costs and benefits of
terminating the plan andpurchasing a group annuity. They can also
help outside investors better evaluate the impact of pension plans
on the financial strength of the sponsoring corporation.
Specifically, we proposed two approaches for the TAR calcu-
lations: the insurer factors-based approach and the simulation-
based factor development approach. Both approaches give rise to a
set of factors that allow sponsors, pension consultants and invest-
ment analysts to quantify the risks of plans with inexpensive and
rapid analysis of multiple scenarios and assumptions. Our factor-
based approaches are not meant to replace more in-depth analysis
of the pension plan and the sponsor. Rather, they serve as an initial
step to signal which plans and scenarios require further analysis.
The simulation-based approach, in particular, can take into account
pension-specific realities and allow the analyst great flexibilities
in making assumptions appropriate for a specific set of plan de-
sign and sponsor characteristics. Once developed, the factors can
be easily re-used without repeating the simulations exercise.
The factor-based approaches can be implemented easily and
inexpensively in practice. Once an appropriate factormethodology
is developed, it entails only minimum additional cost for the
sponsor to use regularly for evaluating alternative courses of action
or as an early warning indicator that pension risk is increasing
to thresholds that require management action. Our methodology
also provides a comparable metric across organizations that can
be used by outside investors and/or regulators for evaluation
and monitoring purposes. For example, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation can easily use the pension TAR to measure
the capability of a sponsor to meet pension obligations. Our
methodology can be used with only public information (such as
what can be discovered in the 10-K filling of a public sponsor)
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Correlations between deficits and risk drivers.
Funding
deficit
Equity
returns
30 year
treasury
Longevity Equity
differential
Interest rate
differential
Longevity
differential
Funding deficit 100% −92% −38% 12% 76% 50% 22%
Equity returns −92% 100% 1% −1% −81% −28% −12%
30 year treasury −38% 1% 100% 1% −5% −61% −4%
Longevity 12% −1% 1% 100% 2% 1% 82%
Equity differential 76% −81% −5% 2% 100% 22% 10%
Interest rate
differential
50% −28% −61% 1% 22% 100% 7%
Longevity differential 22% −12% −4% 82% 10% 7% 100%Table 18
Factors developed for sample and test pension plans.
Equity Mortality Interest rate
Sample plan 35.32% 0.81% 33.38%
Five years older 36.83% 0.85% 29.83%
50% equity investment 35.84% 0.89% 35.56%
0% equity investment N/A 2.84% 65.28%
Table 19
Investment change implications (millions).
AAA capital target A capital target
Initial capital charges for default and
market risk
$23.6 $19.1
Charges with 100% bond allocation $2.5 $2.2
Reduction in unspecified asset
charge
$1.4 $1.1
Reduction in company assets at risk $22 $18.0
Reduction in expected return on
assets ($40 million X 3%)
$1.2 $1.2
or can be further extended to incorporate detailed financial
information of a sponsoring organization.
Defined benefit plans are an economically and strategically
important component of a sponsoring organization’s enterprise
decision-making process. Our paper proposes a measure of
sponsors’ risk due to the plan sponsorship to facilitate their holistic
decision-making. Further work should look at how to evaluate
the risk relative to the sponsor’s cost of capital, how to explicitly
account for correlations among different risk exposures, how the
risk measure can be adjusted to reflect hedging and other risk
management strategies and ultimately, how to fully incorporate
the pension plan related investment and risk management
decisions into the sponsor’s optimal enterprise risk management
and decision making framework.
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